Family Control and the Rent–Seeking Society

By Randall K. Morck, Bernard Yeung. 2003

674 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/de3cae1267cb322c5889bbc2ec665bc27d331b0f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Antoinette Schoar
2. Eric Gedajlovic
3. M. Carney
4. James J. Chrisman
5. Shuang Lin
6. William Mullins
7. Shing-yang Hu
8. Marianne Bertrand

In Economics and Econometrics

1. M. Carney
2. Eric Gedajlovic
3. Alfredo De Massis
4. Danny Miller
5. Belén Villalonga
6. Antoinette Schoar
7. Franz Willi Kellermanns
8. Randall K. Morck

Citations in the corpus

• Implications of Intra-Family and External Ownership Transfer of Family Firms: Short-Term and Long-Term Performance Differences (2011, positive): “For example, goals that benefi t the family may not always be in the best interest of the business, causing some families to retain resources for their own private use and deprive the business of what it needs to grow and prosper (Morck and Yeung, 2004).”
• The Role of Family in Family Firms (2006, positive): “In fact, Morck and Yeung (2004) argue that powerful business families can play an important role in sustaining a high level of political corruption within an economy.”