Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management

By Richard Chung, Michael Firth, Jeong‐Bon Kim. 2002

929 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad3c8e071ec24cbc0ab9bc6c1bb459263ef61737

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Citations in the corpus

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on real and accrual earnings management practices: evidence from Jordan (2019, background): “However, for AEM, overall evidence is mixed with Chung et al. (2002) and Cheng et al. (2013) finding a significant negative relationship between AEM and institutional investors, but other studies, such as Roodposhti and Chashmi (2011), find a positive relationship.”
Tax avoidance, cost of debt and shareholder activism: Evidence from Korea. (2011, background): “However, institutional investors possess greater incentives and capacity to monitor managerial performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Chung et al., 2002; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).2 Thus, the higher the level of institutional ownership, the…”
Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis (2016, background): “Similar to Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002), our measure of earnings management follows the modified Jones model (1991).”
Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market (2012, background): “…al., 2009; Bauguess et al., 2009), dividend decisions (Brav et al., 2005), the pricing of executive stock options (Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003), financial statements (Chung et al., 2002; Park and Shin, 2004), inter-group borrowings (Berkman et al., 2009), and corporate fraud (Chen et al., 2006).”
Bank Income Smoothing, Ownership Concentration and the Regulatory Environment (2014, neutral): “Bushee (1998) and Bange and De Bondt (1998) find that institutional ownership reduces incentives of firms to manage earnings (related to R&D), while Chung et al. (2002) find that firms with large institutional shareholders refrain from earnings management, as it reduces the transparency of the…”
Institutional ownership, product market competition, and earnings management: Some evidence from international data (2018, background): “Institutional investors have the opportunities, resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence managers of firms (Chung et al., 2002). The presence of institutional investors with large share ownership, having the opportunity to benefit from economies of scale in information gathering,”
International Financial Reporting Standards and the quality of financial statement information (2010, background): “Firms tend to influence the reported earnings and their decision-making in order to meet financial analysts' forecasts and investors' expectations and positively affect the stock returns (Moses, 1987; Stulz, 1990; Matsunaga, 1995; Lewellen, Park & Ro, 1996; Yermack, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Kasznik, 1999”
Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Earnings Management in Oman: A New Empirical Insights from a Behavioural Theoretical Framework (2017, neutral): “Although a number of previous studies have examined the effect of a number of different CG mechanisms on corporate EM practices (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Cornett et al., 2008; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Gavious et al., 2012), they are mostly informed by insights drawn from…”
The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees (2007, methodology): “ Chung et al. (2002) further suggest that if the single institutional holding is relatively small but the collective institutional shareholding is high, significant monitoring will take place.”
Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, positive): “Firms with institutional investors use less accruals management (Chung et al., 2002).”
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, positive): “Similarly, Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) hypothesize that there will be less opportunistic earnings management in firms with more institutional investor ownership because the institutions will either put pressure on the firms to adopt better accounting policies, or they will be able to unravel the…”