Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control

By Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock. 2006

331 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa3501be654b44e33d054a0ac4e033fbc38bae26

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Citations in the corpus

• The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing (2009, background): “…recognized but not examined in previous research.9 Our setting is well suited to examine this question, as the incentives to promote spillover effects are particularly strong for union pension funds, which mostly operate as indexed funds (Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999; Kahan and Rock 2007).”
• Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (2009, unknown): “The industryadjusted return is the difference between the target’s buy-and-hold return and the return for all firms (target excluded) in the target’s Fama-French (1997) 48-industry code.”
• The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance (2012, background): “Similarly, Klein and Zur (2009) report that hedge fund activists are successful in pressing target firms to repurchase stock, replace CEOs, and increase board representation of the funds.”
• Does investor identity matter? An empirical examination of investments by venture capital funds and hedge funds in PIPEs ☆ (2007, background): “For original sources of the reports of these events, also see Kahan and Rock (2006).”
• The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice (2007, unknown): “” Kahan and Rock (2007) and Bratton (2007) discuss in detail various aspects of hedge fund activism.”
• Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, unknown): “Critics accuse activist funds of aiming for short-term gains at the expense of long-term shareholder value (Kahan and Rock (2006)).”
• Investor Activism and Takeovers (2009, background): “Kahan and Rock (2006) argue that the combination of increased incentives and fewer constraints makes hedge fund activism less costly and also more likely to be successful than traditional institutional activist investing.”
• Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, unknown): “Hedge fund owners even take positions expecting the stock price to go down, thus adopting a contrary view of ownership; in so doing, they seek to gain wealth through ‘shorting’ firms by betting that firms will actually reduce the wealth of other shareholders (Kahan and Rock, 2009).”