Political Intervention in Debt Contracts

By Patrick Bolton, Howard Rosenthal. Journal of Political Economy, 2002

154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a917af59ab789afaeb04b339fc79110b326f9579

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Amit Seru
2. Tomasz Piskorski
3. Sumit Agarwal
4. S. Chomsisengphet
5. Gene Amromin
6. Itzhak Ben-David
7. Marco Battaglini
8. Arpita Gupta

In Finance

1. Amit Seru
2. Tomasz Piskorski
3. Sumit Agarwal
4. S. Chomsisengphet
5. Gene Amromin
6. Itzhak Ben-David
7. Marina Azzimonti
8. C. Mayer

Citations in the corpus

• The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy (2016, background): “Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) provide an interesting political economy analysis of government imposed private debt moratoria. and his transfer will obtain a per period utility of (”
• Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program (2016, methodology): “We thank Raphael Bostic, John Campbell, John Cochrane, Dennis Glennon, Andrew Haughwout, Bruce Kruger, Chris Mayer, Atif Mian, Uday Rajan, Kristopher Rengert, Rik Sen, Amir Sufi, Francesco Trebbi, Joe Tracy, Kostas Tzioumis, Wilbert van der Klaauw and Luigi Zingales.”
• Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice around the World (2003, unknown): “…state laws granting various forms of protections to indebted farmers and other debtors such as homestead exemptions or stay laws granting temporary or permanent relief (see Bolton and Rosenthal, 2002) for a political economy analysis of these legislative actions following the panic of 1819).”
• Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide (2014, background): “…question 1 Several papers explore the potential benefits of debt relief to both borrowers and lenders during adverse economic conditions, including Bolton and Rosenthal ( 2002 ) ; Kroszner ( 2003 ) ; and Piskorski and Tchistyi ( 2011 ) . externalities for Pathak Because foreclosures may exert…”
• Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises (2012, unknown): “We argue that the existing mechanisms are often ill-suited for resolving the financial crisis, and conclude that there is a meaningful role for political intervention to impose a more even distribution of the losses among creditors and debtors.”
• The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century (2010, unknown): “Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) show that states with restricted suffrage laws were also less likely to pass debtor relief legislation.”
• Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (2010, unknown): “However, there are compelling arguments that in times of significant adverse macro shocks, debt forgiveness and loan renegotiation can create value for both borrowers and investors (Bolton and Rosenthal, 2002; Kroszner, 2003; and Piskorski and Tchistyi, 2008).”