Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis

By Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig. 2010

417 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7d6cc82cf3995ac1d70ce3df7f78fac7093bb146

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Citations in the corpus

Capital Market-Driven Corporate Finance (2009, background): “Keys et al. (2009), Piskorski et al. (2008), andMian& Sufi (2009) find that the source of capital—in this case, the securitized loanmarket—changed the extent of and the nature of screening, renegotiation, and volume of loans.”
Mortgage Market Design (2012, background): “Several recent papers compare modi cation rates and outcomes for securitized and directly held mortgages (Adelino et al. 2009, Agarwal et al. 2011, Foote et al. 2010, Piskorski et al. 2011).”
Adverse selection in mortgage securitization (2012, neutral): “To reduce the extent of left-censoring in the data, we eliminate from our sample loans that entered LPS more than four months after origination, consistent with Piskorski et al. (2010).”
Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide (2014, background): “13 to Although securitization agreements often limit the servicer’s authority modify mortgages ( see Mayer, Morrison, and Piskorski 2009 and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig 2010 , Countrywide stated, “it currently has, or reasonably expects to obtain, discretion to pursue the foreclosure avoidance…”
The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation (2011, positive): “To validate our sample, we replicate the results of two tests in Piskorski et al. (2010).”
The impact of securitization on the expansion of subprime credit (2013, result): “These results are also consistent with evidence provided by KMSV (2010) and KSV (2010) who find higher delinquencies as a function of securitization as well as Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) who show higher foreclosure rates on securitized loans as compared with bank-held loans.”
Securitization and Mortgage Default (2011, positive): “…the length of time it takes to conclude a foreclosure.11 Also, whether or not a delinquent loan is securitized may also affect the ease of modifying it and hence avoiding foreclosure, i.e., monitoring (Piskorski et al. 2010; Agarwal et al. 2011).12 We further address the issue of monitoring below.”
Housing, Finance and the Macroeconomy (2014, positive): “Silos (2007a) studies an equilibrium model with owner-occupied housing where agents vary in age, income and wealth and the price of housing is fixed. He shows that a relaxation of downpayment constraints does not change the business-cycle properties of the model, but affects residential and non-resi”