Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide

By C. Mayer, E. Morrison, Tomasz Piskorski, Arpita Gupta. 2014

229 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/94cf716095855e4d3a69e0d96987ab6d6581d6f1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. John Y. Campbell
2. Kristopher Gerardi
3. Kyle F. Herkenhoff
4. Lee E. Ohanian
5. P. Willen
6. P. Ganong
7. P. Noel
8. Xavier Gabaix

In Economics and Econometrics

1. P. Willen
2. John Y. Campbell
3. Kristopher Gerardi
4. Lee E. Ohanian
5. Kyle F. Herkenhoff
6. P. Ganong
7. P. Noel
8. Rob Collinson

In Finance

1. John Y. Campbell
2. P. Willen
3. Lee E. Ohanian
4. Kyle F. Herkenhoff
5. Kristopher Gerardi
6. P. Ganong
7. P. Noel
8. Carolin E. Pflueger

Citations in the corpus

• Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage Applications During the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005 (2017, unknown): “14 These articles generally focus on mortgages provided for low income, low credit score individuals.(9) Academic research supports the argument that fraud was endemic to mortgage markets during this period. Griffin and Maturana (2014) examine securitized non-agency loans and find that 30% of loans ”
• Mortgage Market Design (2012, background): “Whatever the ultimate outcome of this debate, it is clear that mortgage modi cation is much more costly and perhaps prohibitively so if undistressed borrowers who would otherwise pay their mortgages in full manage to obtain modi cation (Mayer et al. 2011).”
• Liquidity versus Wealth in Household Debt Obligations: Evidence from Housing Policy in the Great Recession (2020, background): “Mayer et al. (2014) document increased defaults after Countrywide announced a generous modification program. The Home Affordable Refinance Program was specifically created to allow underwater borrowers to refinance without needing to become delinquent to get HAMP. Compared to HAMP, a modification wi”
• Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (2015, unknown): “2011) and lender concerns regarding borrowers’ strategic behavior (Mayer et al. 2014).”
• Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market: Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries (2015, unknown): “…and Sandas (2010), Mian and Sufi (2011), Agarwal et al. (2011), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Stanton and Wallace (2011), Demiroglu and James (2012), Nadauld and Sherlund (2013), Purnanandam (2011), Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013), He, Qian, and Strahan (2013), and Mayer et al. (2014).”
• Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default (2018, background): “However, conditioning on delinquency creates the incentive for borrowers to strategically miss mortgage payments, a moral hazard problem that has been documented in the literature (Mayer et al. (2014)).”
• Low-Income Housing Policy (2015, background): “19 paternalistic grounds. Currie (2008) provides a thorough review of the theory justifying in-kind transfers (see also Aaron, 1972).”
• Regulating Household Leverage (2019, unknown): “, 2016), and significant efforts to shore up household balance sheets through debt restructuring and mortgage payment relief (Agarwal et al., 2012; Eberly and Krishnamurthy, 2014; Mayer et al., 2014; Agarwal et al., 2015a; Ganong and Noel, 2017).”
• Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy (2014, unknown): “2011) and lender concerns regarding borrowers’ strategic behavior (Mayer et al. 2014).”