The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century

By Efraim Benmelech, Tobias J. Moskowitz. 2010

214 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8421ffc07913a8f78d9f3692806ee232439f3804

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Citations in the corpus

Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value (2009, unknown): “7 Note that Faccio’s initial sample does include companies from countries with low levels of corruption such as the United Kingdom and the United States, but she finds no value impact for those companies. at U niversity of A labam a on January 24, 2013 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded fro”
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, unknown): “…by distributing favors in the form of bailouts (Faccio et al. (2006); Tahoun and Van Lent (2016)), reduced government oversight (Correia (2014); Yu and Yu (2012)), more government contracts (Goldman et al. (2009); Tahoun (2014)), and reduced market competition (Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010)).”
Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century (2011, unknown): “…the legal origins of finance, see LaPorta et al. (1998) and Levine (2005); and on the role of constituencies or interest groups, see, for example, Benmelech and Moskowitz (2007), Claessens and Perotti (2007), Haber and Perotti (2007), Haber (2005a,b), Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2006), Pagano…”
Financial reforms and income inequality (2012, background): “In the same vein, Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) highlight that financial regulation has been typically led by private interests of wealthy incumbents in the form of rents from others.”
The Role of Stock Ownership by US Members of Congress on the Market for Political Favors (2014, unknown): “…2008; Ramanna 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008, 2009; Cole 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2009; Correia 2009; Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010; Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010. communications business whose principal backers . . . had raised more than $150,000 for his political committees.””
Entrepreneurial finance, credit cards, and race☆ (2012, result): “Our findings are also related to Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010, whose study of historical interest rates in the US shows that tighter interest rate ceilings lower economic activity, particularly for small firms.”