Ownership Structure and Firm Profitability in Japan

By Eric Gedajlovic, Daniel M. Shapiro. 2002

322 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate governance and operating performance of Chinese listed firms (2011, methodology): “For instance, Gompers et al. (2003) use data from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) to develop a Governance Index (GIndex).”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, background): “Similarly, research into business groups suggest that parent corporations may be more inclined to bail out affiliated firms through cross-subsidization mechanisms in difficult economic conditions (Claessens, Fan & Lang, 2006; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002).”
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration – Malaysian evidence (2018, background): “National differences in corporate governance and how governance should best be implemented are still being debated (Desender et al., 2013; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).”
Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding (2009, background): “During crises, corporate wealth is siphoned off by controlling shareholders to escape their own creditors, while better-performing firms are called upon by their underperforming affiliates to “ bail them out ” (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Granovetter, 2005).”
Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant? (2011, background): “A second theoretical contribution lies in the identification that the benefits and costs of family ownership and control vary systematically according to the level of legal and Table 9 Study 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations.”
Corporate Governance in Pakistan : Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing (2010, background): “Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) are also of the view that financial institutions are well positioned to monitor the manager of the firm within their network.”
Doing the right thing and knowing the right thing to do: why the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (2003, background): “…governance structures for joint ventures (Reuer, 2001; Reuer & Miller, 1997), and on explaining inter-firm heterogeneity in performance as a function of inter-firm heterogeneity in ownership structure (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998, 2002; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).”
The Performance Implications of Ownership-driven Governance Reform (2003, unknown): “Other studies have also examined the relationships between shareholdings by banks, partner firms and foreign investors and the performance of Japanese firms (e.g. Aoki, 2002, Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002, Kang and Shivdasani, 1995, Nitta, 2000, Prowse, 1990).”
Do Shareholders or Stakeholders Appropriate the Rents from Corporate Diversification? The Influence of Ownership Structure (2010, background): “Empirical evidence has affirmed the profit redistribution contention, wherein relational owners “tax” profitable firms to benefit poorly performing firms that need financial assistance (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996).”
Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Performance: The Moderating Effects of Investment Horizon, Activism, and Coordination (2006, background): “…salience posits that institutional owners’ large equity holdings will highlight the importance of their demands in the minds of senior executives, giving them the power to influence firms’ objectives (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), including their support of CSP (Johnson & Greening, 1999).”