Mortal Questions: What is it like to be a bat?

By T. Nagel. 2012

3,996 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a31a327c0147e1c637ca95347e9edad5311ec1dc

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Citations in the corpus

On the relation between ecosystem services, intrinsic value, existence value and economic valuation (2013, background): “Apart from the problem of imagining what it is like to be a nonhuman organism (see e.g., Nagel, 1974; Carruthers, 1989) such a comparison depends upon the unit of harm.”
Spatiotemporal Dimensions of Visual Signals in Animal Communication (2007, background): “Timothy Sprigge’s classic question, popularized by Thomas Nagel (1974), provides a compelling metaphor for students of animal www.annualreviews.org • Visual Signals in Animal Communication 171 A nn u.”
Cognitive Perspectives in Psychology (2013, neutral): “Second, since the bandwidth of our senses is very limited, we only experience a small number of the environment's properties (Nagel, 1974; Winn & Windschitl, 2001b).”
‘Oh, was that “experiential learning”?!’ Spaces, synergies and surprises with Kolb’s learning cycle (2016, background): “In practice, the ‘phenomenological attitude’ is usually explained as the ‘what is it like?’ question (Nagel, 1974).”
Why fish do not feel pain (2016, background): “Qualia are often described as the “what it feels like” when we perceive our environment (Nagel, 1974; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012).”
Insects have the capacity for subjective experience (2016, background): “Qualia are often described as the “what it feels like” when we perceive our environment (Nagel, 1974; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012).”
Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” (2011, background): “Now I do not say that we have now or are likely to get soon an explanation of experience in neural terms, but as Nagel (1974) pointed out, we can have evidence for a physicalist thesis without yet having developed the concepts that would be needed for an explanatory understanding of it.”
Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: a first empirical case study (2002, neutral): “In the analytical literature this distinction has been captured by Thomas Nagel’s phrase “what it is like" to experience something (1970). 3 For a detailed review see for instance Roy et al.”
The endogenous origins of experience, routines, and organizational capabilities: the poverty of stimulus (2010, background): “The notion of intentionality suggests that we take seriously the matter of ‘free will’ and choice (cf. Chisholm, 1967; Lucas, 1970), and other closely related notions such as volition (Zhu, 2004) and consciousness (Nagel, 1974).”
Anthropomorphism, empathy, and perceived communicative ability vary with phylogenetic relatedness to humans. (2010, background): “As Nagel (1974) points out, we cannot truly know “what it’s like to be a bat” because we cannot escape our extrapolations of the world brought to us by human subjectivity.”