Corporate Boards and Regulation: The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Exchange Listing Requirements on Firm Value
By M. Babajide Wintoki. 2007
194 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bf7ecfdbe078013d3befcbb4549032f2db34918
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In Accounting
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- John E. Core
- David F. Larcker
- Christian Leuz
- Feng Li
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Robert M. Bushman
In Finance
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- John E. Core
- David F. Larcker
- Robert M. Bushman
- Qiang Cheng
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Sanjai Bhagat
Citations in the corpus
- The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US (2007, unknown): “A few recent papers estimate cross-sectional effects for US companies (Grinstein and Chhaochharia, 2007; Wintoki, 2006). Three contemporaneous papers (Berger et al., 2005; Kamar et al., 2005; Smith, 2007) look beyond US public companies to cross-listed foreign companies. Berger et al. (2005) compare”
- CEO Duality , Competition , and Firm Performance (2012, unknown): “As there are no clear event dates, we follow the long-run event study methodology in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Wintoki (2007) and calculate excess portfolio returns for an extended event window using the following fourfactor model: Rpt-Rft =αp + β1(Rmt- Rft) + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt +…”
- Bundles of Firm Corporate Governance Practices: A Fuzzy Set Analysis (2013, unknown): “Recent studies also find that the introduction of new CG regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US can be counterproductive for some companies’ valuation (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007).”
- Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency (2014, background): “9 A number of recent papers also rely on the 2003 NYSE and Nasdaq regulations (or some variant) as an instrument with which they have documented causal effects of board structure on firm value (Wintoki, 2007; Duchin et al., 2010), CEO compensation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009), credit risk (Che”