Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?

By Boris Vallée, Yao Zeng. The Review of financial studies, 2019

184 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Marketplace lending relies on screening and information production by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, the participation of sophisticated investors improves screening outcomes and also creates adverse selection among investors. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades off these two forces. As the platform develops, it optimally increases platform prescreening intensity but decreases information provision to investors. Using novel investor-level data, we find that sophisticated investors systematically outperform, and this outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors. Our findings shed light on the optimal distribution of information production in this new lending model.Received August 29, 2018; editorial decision July 1, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0008288f82ae8f4b2df1c6dc48679533d02042b

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Giana M. Eckhardt
  2. Mark Houston
  3. Feng Zhu
  4. Georgios Zervas
  5. Stijn Claessens
  6. Cait Lamberton
  7. Marco Di Maggio
  8. Baojun Jiang

In Finance

  1. Feng Zhu
  2. Stijn Claessens
  3. Cait Lamberton
  4. Marco Di Maggio
  5. Vincent Yao
  6. Thorsten Beck
  7. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
  8. Luc Laeven

In Management Information Systems

  1. Stijn Claessens
  2. Marco Di Maggio
  3. Baojun Jiang
  4. Jon Frost
  5. Vincent Yao
  6. A. Rindfleisch
  7. Anna M. Costello

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