On the Robustness of Majority Rule
By Partha Dasgupta, Eric Maskin. 2008
190 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms-the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness-over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952). (JEL: D71) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b6e0da17ca72d3d22220de8d5b280ddf384b56b
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas
- Willem Karel M. Brauers
- Zenonas Turskis
- Abbas Mardani
- Ahmad Jusoh
- Huchang Liao
- Zeshui Xu
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In Management Science and Operations Research
- Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas
- Willem Karel M. Brauers
- Zenonas Turskis
- Abbas Mardani
- Tomas Balezentis
- Alvydas Balezentis
- Ahmad Jusoh
- Huchang Liao
Citations in the corpus
- Robustness of the multi‐objective MOORA method with a test for the facilities sector (2009, background): “Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) maintain that the simple majority rule is the most robust voting rule.”
- School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation. NBER Working Paper No. 16783. (2011, unknown): “…Erdil and Klemperer (2011) who each seek to design a combinatorial auction that minimizes manipulability, and to a lesser extent Kesten (2006) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) who make comparisons across allocation rules based on inclusion of environments focusing on nonstrategic properties of…”
- Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations (2006, unknown): “Other papers that provide theoretical justifications for (simple or super) majority rules are May [13], Rae [16], Taylor [19], Caplin and Nalebuff [7], Austen-Smith and Banks [2], Dasgupta and Maskin [9], and Messner and Polborn [14].”