Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services

By J. Bennett, Elisabetta Iossa. 2006

325 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/96a864ddbfe53e3cf307d3d584abf6a4b954f366

Citations in the corpus

• Contracts, relationships and integration: towards a model of the procurement of complex performance (2009, unknown): “After all, if PCP contracts are both incomplete (e.g. Lonsdale, 2005b; Bennett and Iossa, 2006) and excessively detailed, it is likely they will be inflexible and difficult to monitor expost (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980).”
• Public and private sector discount rates in public–private partnerships† (2003, unknown): “3 There are several theoretical papers that address the efficiency of PPPs, notably, Bennett and Iossa (2002), Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2002) and Hart (2002) (see also Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997)).”
• Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (2013, unknown): “8 The interaction of the mode of provision and different ownership structures under symmetric information has been studied by Bennett and Iossa (2006a,b) and Chen and Chiu (2010). A common feature of their models and our framework is that second-stage service improvements are non-contractible ex ant”
• Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France (2006, unknown): “externalities between the two stages of production (Hart 2003 and Bennett & Iossa 2004 ).”
• The economic or infrastructure finance: Public-Private Partnership versus public provision. (2010, unknown): “10 For references that consider one or both elements described above as possible arguments in favour of PPPs, see Grout (1997); Hart (2003); Bennett and Iossa (2006); Bentz et al. (2005); Martimort and Pouyet (2008); Iossa and Martimort (2008).”
• The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships (2004, unknown): “34See also King and Pitchford (2000), and Bennett and Iossa (2003) for more general analyses of bundling of two activities, which share similarities with Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hart (2003).”
• Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits (2008, unknown): “18 (3) We have focused on taxpayer-financed projects.”
• Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance (2012, unknown): “9 This hybrid mode of state capitalism should also be distinguished from hybrid public-private partnerships crafted to execute specific infrastructure projects or public services such as water supply, transport, prisons, and so on (Bennett & Iossa, 2006; Cabral, Lazzarini, & Azevedo, 2010).”
• Flexible contracts to cope with uncertainty in public–private partnerships (2013, unknown): “The rationale for this " bundling " is uncertainty in demand forecasting and the private sector capacity of innovation in building and managing (Bennett and Iossa, 2006).”
• A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts (2013, unknown): “7Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Qiu and Wang (2011) also examine how moral hazard is affected by the transfer of ownership of PPPs from the private to the public sector when concession contracts expire.”
• To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships (2008, unknown): “Two papers address issues close to ours: Bennett and Iossa (2002) and Hart (2003).”
• The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships (2013, unknown): “As is traditional in economics, the expression for consumer surplus in (4) includes the social costs caused by tax collection.”
• Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships (2002, unknown): “(2002) and Bennett and Iossa (2002). Bennett and Iossa’s model is based on incomplete contracts and is similar in a number of ways to the model presented here (it was developed independently).”
• The dynamics of contractual and relational governance: Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements (2008, unknown): “Moreover, long-term PFI supply arrangements tend to increase asset specificity (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; Lonsdale, 2005) and uncertainty related to long-term supplier commitment (Leiringer, 2006).”