Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

By Oliver Hart. 2002

999 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4de860a446d4f47058fc6dd5ceb8da8f70b21775

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Citations in the corpus

Transaction Costs in Transport Public–Private Partnerships: Comparing Procurement Procedures (2010, background): “One, made by Hart (2002), used the incomplete contract theory to analyse PPP projects and came up with some important findings: the choice between PPPs and conventional provision depends on whether it is easier to write service provision contracts or building (or infrastructure) provision contracts.”
Urban rail transit PPPs: Survey and risk assessment of recent strategies (2007, background): “Hart (2003) suggests that it is ‘strange’ for policy makers to frequently argue that PPPs are good because the private sector is a cheaper source of financing or insurance than the public sector, as ‘it is hard to imagine an agent that is more able to borrow or to provide insurance than the…”
Infrastructure Public–Private Partnerships in the Developing World: Lessons from Recent Experience (2015, background): “In Hart’s model, for example, bundling leads the firm to internalise the costs of operating the facility (Hart [2003]; see also Hart, Shleifer, & Vishny [1997]).”
Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France (2006, background): “externalities between the two stages of production ( Hart 2003 and Bennett & Iossa 2004).”
The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships (2013, neutral): “and u′(m − I ) = ζ̄u′(M − I ), (22) where ζ̄ = (λζ−α)/(λ−α) and Π(wλ, wλζ) is a shortcut for the expectation of Π(p∗(η(θ),θ),θ) conditional onΠ(p∗(λ,θ),θ) = wλ andΠ(p∗(λζ,θ),θ) = wλζ.”
Public and private sector discount rates in public–private partnerships† (2003, background): “(2002), Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2002) and Hart (2002) (see also Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997)).”
Public Private Partnerships and Public Procurement (2007, neutral): “Another defining characteristic of a PPP is 'bundling', whereby the infrastructure asset's construction and operation is combined in a single contractual framework ( Hart, 2003 ).”
The dynamics of contractual and relational governance: Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements (2008, neutral): “PPP/PFI contracts are complex (typically consisting of multiple agreements covering the design, building, finance and operation phases of a project) and incomplete (parties cannot specify legally enforceable safeguards for the vast number of future contingencies at the outset of a 30 years relations”
Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector-Outsourcing Contracts (2005, background): “The similarities between the make-or-buy decision and public sector outsourcing were recently analysed by Hart (2003) .”
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering (2013, neutral): “Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Bös (1991), Shleifer (1998), and Martimort (2006).”
Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits (2008, background): “3 Hart (2003), Bennett and Iossa (2004), and Martimort and Pouyet (2006).”
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions (2005, neutral): “This question has been studied by Hart (2003) in an incomplete contracts setting, focused on the hold-up problem.”