The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships
By E. Engel, Ronald Fischer, Alexander Galetovic. 2013
377 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fa83f8ad7271908670fa79e40c8ce122bec0f9d7
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- E. Auriol
- C. Sharma
- Pierre Picard
- M. Amaral
- Ronald Fischer
- Alexander Galetovic
- E. Engel
- Stéphane Saussier
Citations in the corpus
- Determinants of PPP in infrastructure in developing economies (2012, background): “While Engel et al. (2008) defined PPP in infrastructure project where (i) assets are controlled by a private firm for a (possibly infinite) term; (ii) during the duration of the contract, the firm is the residual claimant, while the government is the residual claimant at the end of the concession.”
- A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts (2013, background): “This literature generally relates the issues of moral hazard in project financing and firm’s operation (Vaillancourt Rosenau, 2000; Engel et al. 2007), production complementarity (Martimort and Pouyet 2009), or political economics (Maskin and Tirole, 2008).”
- The economic or infrastructure finance: Public-Private Partnership versus public provision. (2010, background): “We have formalized this Irrelevance result in Engel et al. (2007), and present a simplified version here (Box 1).”
- Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London (2009, background): “When it comes to the organization of public services through public–private partnerships, collusion and corruption behaviours have been widely studied, especially in less developed countries (see for example Engel et al., 2006; Guasch, 2004 for empirical evidences).”