RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis
By Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, Eran Tromer. Annual International Cryptology Conference, 2014
471 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/962ffb68cd2b0cd0addb550c6a09815243b146a0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Daniel Gruss
- Michael Schwarz
- Yuval Yarom
- Mohammadkazem Taram
- Stefan Mangard
- Moritz Lipp
- Dean M. Tullsen
- Srini Devadas
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Ramesh Karri
- Masoud Rostami
- Farinaz Koushanfar
- Ruby B. Lee
- Srini Devadas
- Dean M. Tullsen
- Stefan Mangard
- Gernot Heiser
Citations in the corpus
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution (2018, background): “Since their introduction in the late 90’s [43], many physical effects such as power consumption [41, 42], electromagnetic radiation [58], or acoustic noise [20] have been leveraged to extract cryptographic keys as well as other secrets.”
- Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical (2015, background): “While it is possible to leak information from these implementations [12, 13], we are not aware of a micro-architectural attack that can exploit this weakness.”
- CacheBleed: a timing attack on OpenSSL constant-time RSA (2016, background): “3 University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA laboratory equipment) of physical phenomena such as electromagnetic radiation [48], power consumption [35,36], or acoustic emanation [25], and software-based attacks, which do not require additional equipment but rely instead on the attacker software r”
- Intel SGX Explained (2016, background): “[60] extracts an RSA key from GnuPG running on a laptop using a microphone that measures its acoustic emissions.”
- Context-Sensitive Fencing: Securing Speculative Execution via Microcode Customization (2019, background): “mizations such as caches, branch speculation, memory disambiguation, and even DVFS, through side-channels such as memory bus activity [4], power consumption characteristics [8], branch access patterns [2, 29], faults [47, 40], acoustics [33, 32], electromagnetic effects [30], functional unit timing ”
- A Primer on Hardware Security: Models, Methods, and Metrics (2014, methodology): “Power consumption [10], electromagnetic (EM) emanations [77], photonic emissions [78], and acoustic noise of the system [79] are all correlated with the exponent, and can be used to extract the secret.”