Capacity Constrained Supply Function Equilibrium Models of Electricity Markets: Stability, Non- decreasing constraints, and Function Space Iterations

By Ross Baldick, William W. Hogan. 2002

187 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Two Market Models for Demand Response in Power Networks (2010, methodology): “The electricity supply deficit is normalized to be 100, and the values for parameters ai and hi used to obtain numerical results are randomly drawn from [1, 2] and [2, 6], respectively.”
Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Spot Markets with Contracts and Price Caps (2005, background): “Recently Baldick and Hogan [ 7 ] have discussed the existence of supply function equilibria when there are price caps.”
Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets (2004, methodology): “Baldick and Hogan (2002) show that SFE prices will be below Cournot prices throughout such a time horizon.”
Supply function equilibrium bidding strategies with fixed forward contracts (2005, background): “less competitive than the linear SFE are unstable [13].”
Electricity Market Equilibrium Models: The Effect of Parameterization (2002, background): “See [14], [15] for a discussion of this issue.”
Real Time Pricing and Electricity Markets (2009, unknown): “E[ ihd j T = 1; h; d] = E[ ihd j T = 0; h; d] (8)”
Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Energy Sources (2017, methodology): “This model was ﬁrst developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), and later applied in the wholesale electricity markets by Green and Newbery (1992); Rudkevich, Duckworth and Rosen (1998); Baldick and Hogan (2002); Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004).”
Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium (2009, background): “However, in the uniform-price auction, there is a continuum of equilibria as in other SFE models (such as Baldick and Hogan [ 16 ], Day, Hobbs and Pang [17], Anderson and Philpott [18], Klemperer and Meyer [19]) in which equilibrium prices range from marginal cost to the price cap.”
Increasing the Value of Wind with Energy Storage (2011, background): “Firm ’s FONC becomes: i As discussed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Baldick and Hogan (2002), Holm-berg (2007), and Holmberg (2009), one of the difﬁculties with the SFE model is that there is typically not a unique equilibrium, and asymmetric SFE can be difﬁcult to compute.”
Optimal offering strategies for generation companies operating in electricity spot markets (2004, background): “They are more sophisticated but significantly more difficult to solve [3], [9], [19].”