Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer

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Goal! Profit Maximization Versus Win Maximization in Soccer (2009, background): “Testing for mixed strategies in tennis (Walker and Wooders 2001) and penalty taking in soccer ( Chiappori et al. 2002; Palacios-Huerta 2003) are perhaps two of the best known examples that confirm behavior consistent with maximizing choices by contestants.”
Professionals Play Minimax (2003, background): “As indicated earlier, Chiappori et al. (2002) are concerned with problems of aggregation when few observations are available per player and the Minimax equilibrium implications forindividual players, including serial independence, cannot be tested.”
What Happens in the Field Stays in the Field: Exploring Whether Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments (2009, result): “Complementing these data are results from Chiappori et al. (2002) and Palacios-Huerta (2003), who examine penalty kicks in”
Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure? (2005, background): “ Chiappori et al. (2002) show that the game, which belongs to the “matching”