Professionals Play Minimax
By Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. 2003
330 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d043d6a480add3ba03af4cfaa52e080289c17b19
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Luis Garicano
- Pedro Garcia‐del‐Barrio
- Oscar Volij
- Colin F. Camerer
- Canice Prendergast
- Stefan Szymanski
- Yona Rubinstein
- Gary S. Becker
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Colin F. Camerer
- Oscar Volij
- Canice Prendergast
- Luis Garicano
- Yona Rubinstein
- Gary S. Becker
- Stefan Szymanski
- Pedro Garcia‐del‐Barrio
In Safety Research
- Luis Garicano
- Colin F. Camerer
- Oscar Volij
- Canice Prendergast
- Yona Rubinstein
- Gary S. Becker
- Stefan Szymanski
- Pedro Garcia‐del‐Barrio
Citations in the corpus
- The Promise and Success of Lab-Field Generalizability in Experimental Economics: A Critical Reply to Levitt and List (2011, background): “…same limit applies to field-field comparisons (see Liebbrandt [2011]) Soccer: Palacios-Huerta and Volij [2008] (PHV 2008 herein) designed a 2x2 lab matching pennies game designed closely to resemble soccer penalty kicks, in which players appear to approximately randomize [Palacios-Huerta, 2003].”
- Fear and the Response to Terrorism: An Economic Analysis (2011, background): “Our main 17Recently, Palacios-Huerta (2003) and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008) find that soccer players randomize in the field as well as in the lab (in both a game that resembles a penalty kick and in a zero-sum game they have not seen previously) respectively 15 sample for the survey years 1999…”
- Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks (2007, background): “Because the time it takes the ball to reach the goal from the penalty mark is only about 0.2-0.3 seconds (see Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose, 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003), the goalkeeper generally cannot afford to wait until he sees clearly to which direction the ball is kicked before choosing…”
- Does Experience Teach? Professionals and Minimax Play in the Lab (2010, neutral): “(See Walker-Wooders (2001) and Hsu-HuangTang (2007) for tennis, and Chiapppori, Levitt, and Groseclose (2002) and Palacios-Huerta (2003) for soccer).”
- Favoritism Under Social Pressure (2005, methodology): “Recent studies have also tested for Nash equilibrium behavior in strategic settings using sports data (for example, Walker & Wooders, 2001; Chiappori, Levitt, & Groseclose, 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003).”
- Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments ∗ (2008, methodology): “Palacios-Huerta (2003) found that the behavior of professional players in the soccer field was consistent with equilibrium play: (i) their winning probabilities were statistically identical across strategies and (ii) their choices were serially independent.”
- Goal! Profit Maximization Versus Win Maximization in Soccer (2009, background): “Testing for mixed strategies in tennis (Walker and Wooders 2001) and penalty taking in soccer (Chiappori et al. 2002; Palacios-Huerta 2003 ) are perhaps two of the best known examples that confirm behavior consistent with maximizing choices by contestants.”