Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants

By William E. Stein. 2002

185 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/944c9424da372f3e4edc1bcda9845990ebcb256f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Stefan Szymanski
2. Jennifer Brown
3. Tommaso M. Valletti
4. Rob Simmons
5. Michael Grubb
6. Andrea Weber
7. Christine Zulehner

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Stefan Szymanski
2. Jennifer Brown
3. Tommaso M. Valletti

In Safety Research

1. Stefan Szymanski
2. Jennifer Brown
3. Tommaso M. Valletti

Citations in the corpus

• Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars (2011, background): “Stein (2002) presents a rent-seeking contest model with n heterogeneous participants competing for a single prize, and Szymanski and Valletti (2005) consider three-person contests with multiple prizes.”
• Incentive effects of second prizes (2005, background): “Asymmetry has been studied in the imperfectly discriminating contest literature, e.g. Dixit (1987), Baik (1994), Nti (1999) and Stein (2002).”
• Forthcoming in Public Choice A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter (2005, unknown): “For example, see equation (4) in Stein (2002).”
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “19 It is also well documented that, theoretically (Baik, 1994; Stein, 2002), heterogeneity between players leads to lower aggregate effort.”