Incentive effects of second prizes

By Stefan Szymanski, Tommaso M. Valletti. 2005

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a759b958b5d2c8e4e855b6b558da8eca0d0a65dc

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Finance

1. Roman M. Sheremeta

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Roman M. Sheremeta
3. Dan Kovenock

In Marketing

1. Roman M. Sheremeta
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Emmanuel Dechenaux

Citations in the corpus

• A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “Moreover, across a wide range of specific contest models, multiple prizes may generate higher efforts when contestants are risk-averse (Krishna and Morgan 1998; Kalra and Shi 2001) or heterogeneous (Szymanski and Valletti 2005; Moldovanu et al. 2007).”
• Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, unknown): “The non-optimality of a single large prize can also occur in a contest where players have commonly known but different abilities (Szymanski and Valletti, 2005).”
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests (2014, unknown): “Thus, contrasting both the pure-strategy equilibrium in the lottery contest and the continuous mixed-strategy equilibrium in the all-pay auction, 1 See, e.g., Che and Gale (2000), Szymanski and Valetti (2003), Konrad and Kovenock (2009), Schweinzer and Segev (2012), and Franke et al. (2013).”