Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars

By Jennifer Brown. Journal of Political Economy, 2011

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Sabotage in contests: a survey (2015, neutral): “In a standard horse race, every horse is required to carry a 10It is observed in sports such as Golf (Brown, 2011) that a difference in effi ciency might discourage low effi ciency players so that the overall effort exerted in the contest may be low.”
Tournaments for Ideas (2010, background): “For example, it has been found that professional golfers score nearly one stroke higher (worse) than they normally do when competing in tournaments in which Tiger Woods (a superstar in the game of golf) is present.(8)”
Heterogeneous Peer Effects and Rank Concerns: Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “Rank concerns have been studied also in the literature on tournaments (Brown 2011, Genakos and Pagliero 2012).”
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis (2011, background): “…al. (2007) study empirically, with data on NASCAR races, the risk-taking behavior of drivers according to their relative ranking and position, and Brown (2008) studies how motivations of “ordinary” professional golfers change when a superstar (e.g., Tiger Woods) participates in a tournament.…”
Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China (2018, neutral): “(2010); Brown (2011); Pope and Schweitzer (2011).”