The Role of Control in Attributing Intentional Agency to Inanimate Objects
By A. Johnson, Justin L. Barrett. 2003
88 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/93b20ea210c18cf3b1e3ebf4094e06fda8f64812
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Adam Waytz
- Nicholas Epley
- Bertram F. Malle
- John T. Cacioppo
- Jamy J. Li
- Tim Miller
- Joshua Knobe
- A. Monga
Citations in the corpus
- WHEN WE NEED A HUMAN: MOTIVATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM (2008, background): “…with another agent (Berger & Douglas, 1981; Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976), interacting with an apparently unpredictable agent (Barrett & Johnson, 2003), or having a high “need for control” (Burger & Cooper, 1979)—should increase effectance motivation and anthropomorphism,…”
- From Trolley to Autonomous Vehicle: Perceptions of Responsibility and Moral Norms in Traffic Accidents with Self-Driving Cars (2016, background): “This effect may be particularly salient with autonomous vehicles because people are more likely to attribute intentional agency to a moving object when they lack control over its movement [18].”
- On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. (2007, background): “In another experiment, participants were more likely to attribute intentionality to the movement of marbles when they were unable to control them (with a magnet) than when they were able to control them (J. L. Barrett & Johnson, 2003).”