The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

By A. Polinsky, Steve Shavell, Alexander J. J. Gould, Janine Scancarelli, T. Stanley, Daniel Klerman, John Pencavel. 2000

205 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/937baeebdf8c862bc3d65a571fe2180dd0d59315

Citations in the corpus

• Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America (2003, unknown): “(1970), Becker and Stigler (1974), Posner (1972) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a recent synthesis), but has been little addressed by modern contract theory.”
• Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent (2006, unknown): “The law and economics literature has been much concerned with determining the optimal level of sanctions (see Polinsky and Shavell 2000a).”
• What Works in Securities Laws (2006, unknown): “4 These themes are developed in Landis (1938), Becker (1968), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), and Pistor and Xu (2002).”
• Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions (2007, unknown): “However, it is also well established that the provision of UI does not come without adverse incentive e¤ects.”