Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions
By Jan Boone, Peter Fredriksson, B. Holmlund, J. van Ours. 2007
156 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d689dae905f2ad6a9ebb38943d0b6b42bcd50b4a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- J. van Ours
- Rafael Lalive
- Patrick Arni
- Alan Manning
- Giovanni L. Violante
- Nicola Pavoni
- Andrea Weber
- Greg Kaplan
Citations in the corpus
- Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs (2007, background): “Recently, Boone et al. (2002) have addressed the issue of the optimality of job-search monitoring within a structural search model of the labor market.”
- You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance (2009, background): “There are also models of the impact of sanctions paying particular attention to the stochastic element of the eligibility conditions (see Boone et al, 2000, 2001), something that probably adds both realism and complication to the model.”
- How Effective are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit (2009, background): “Finally, we do not address general equilibrium effects of sanctions, as discussed in Boone et al. (2007).”
- Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research (2006, unknown): “The paper by Boone et al. (2002) examines to what extent the optimal UI policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient.”