Concentrated Corporate Ownership: Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights

By L. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman, George G. Triantis. 2000

225 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91cb5d63b7ce0b7957b62d07a30e4ba057703d2c

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting (2002, unknown): “(For example, see Bacon, Cornett, and Davidson, 1997; Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; and Kunz and Angel, 1996.)”
Incentive and entrenchment effects in European ownership (2009, background): “From an analytical perspective, Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) show that any desired separation of ownership and control can be achieved through the use of either dual class shares, or pyramids, or cross-ownership.”
Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups (2003, background): “Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000), Morck et al. (2000), and others argue that family business groups can have serious corporate governance problems.”
Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “…conflicts wherein some large owners extract the benefits of control at the expense of minority owners through the use of pyramid structures, cross-ownership, and/or dual-class equity mechanisms (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; Chang, 2003; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2005).”
Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups (2003, background): “…(the actual level minus the firm average of related party sales level), as the measure of excess a positive number indicates a higher related party sales level than the firm s own average (a sign that the related party sales might be managed upward) while a negative number implies the opposite.”
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? (2007, unknown): “…conventional, albeit typically informal, view that pyramidal groups are formed to generate a wedge between control and cash flow rights – an approach that can perhaps explain to some extent the prevalence of business groups rather than conglomerates (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2000; Bianco et al., 2001).”