Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk

By C. Starmer. 2000

2,004 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/916ac5b8e0943b0aeccab415b142f3b771db0b7c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In General Decision Sciences

Citations in the corpus

Why humans are (sometimes) less rational than other animals: Cognitive complexity and the axioms of rational choice (2013, background): “The model of rational judgement used by decision scientists is one in which a person chooses options based on which option has the largest expected utility (Dawes, 1998; Fishburn, 1981, 1999; Gauthier, 1975; Kahneman, 1994; McFadden, 1999; Resnik, 1987; Starmer, 2000; Wu, Zhang, & Gonzalez, 2004).”
ARROW–DEBREU EQUILIBRIA FOR RANK‐DEPENDENT UTILITIES (2016, positive): “We do not assume any particular distribution of the aggregate future endowment, nor do 2As Starmer (2000) put it in a survey paper, “the rank-dependent model is likely to become more widely used” because it captures many empirical observations “in a model which is quite amenable to application…”
An index of loss aversion (2005, background): “Given the abundant evidence of the empirical failures of expected utility, the development of tractable alternative theories for decision under risk is desirable [55,57].”
Behaviour Theory and Soft Transport Policy Measures (2011, result): “This assumption is similar to expected utility theories (Starmer, 2004) that have been proposed to account for discrete choice.”
A Closer Look at Socioemotional Wealth: Its Flows, Stocks, and Prospects for Moving Forward (2015, background): “Do they work in concert or do they sometimes come into conflict? For example, Vardaman and Gondo (2014) argue that family control and identity can sometimes come into conflict causing family firms to shift their emphasis from the former to the latter with concomitant alterations in their behaviors.”
Eliciting risk preferences: When is simple better? (2010, background): “5 Starmer (2000) surveys the symbiotic theoretical and empirical developments in analyzing decision making under risk.”
Hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for cumulative prospect theory (2011, background): “…theory (Mellers, 2000), the dual system model of preference under risk (Mukherjee, 2010), and the rank-dependent expected utility theories (e.g., Quiggin, 1982; for a summary of alternatives to expected utility see Camerer, 1989; Machina, 1989; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006; Starmer, 2000).”
Divergence between individual perceptions and objective indicators of tail risks: Evidence from floodplain residents in New York City (2015, background): “Empirical data reveal that individuals often behave in ways that deviate from this model (Conlisk 1996; Starmer 2000; Kahneman 2003).”
Third-generation prospect theory (2008, methodology): “We adopt the power function which has been widely used in recent empirical literature (see Starmer 2000).”
A Review of Risk Perceptions and Other Factors that Influence Flood Mitigation Behavior (2012, background): “Examining risk perceptions and their relation to protective behavior with cognitive variables, such as the “perceived likelihood” or “consequence,” reflects a very rational concept of the term “risk,” and is in line with expected utility theory.(72) According to this view, people’s reaction to a ris”