Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications

By Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2003

423 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8e2d1c0658e7b203e9b06d386c76a2d3eac14fc9

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Citations in the corpus

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining (2003, neutral): “2 For a recent survey of theories of fairness and reciprocity, see Fehr and Schmidt (2002).”
Fairness and Redistribution: U.S. Versus Europe (2003, neutral): “Fehr and Schmidt (2001) provide an extensive review of the experimental evidence on fairness, altruism, and reciprocity.”
Experimental economics: Where next? (2010, background): “Their reply also cites two further papers that are not mentioned in their invited address (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003).”
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness (2001, neutral): “The analysis of the bonus contract is a little more complicated.”
Trust games: A meta-analysis (2011, background): “, Cobo-Reyes, R., & Jiménez, N. (2008). An investment game with third-party intervention. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(1), 18–28. Chaudhuri, A., & Sbai, E. (2011). Gender differences in trust and reciprocity in repeated gift exchange games.”
Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts (2010, neutral): “…a re- sponse to the vast experimental evidence challenging the standard hypothesis of sel shness .9 A variety of models were devised to explain these observations.10 It would be too di¢ cult to discuss all the models, so we refer to the excellent surveys of Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Sobel (2005).”
Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility (2002, background): “In field, experiment and survey studies, it has been shown that prosocial preferences influence market behavior (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Bewley, 1999; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003 ).”
Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents (2008, background): “…Von Siemens (2005), Dur and Glazer (2008), and Englmaier and Wambach (2005) for applications of outcome based models to contracting and incentives, Englmaier (2005) for a survey of this literature, as well as Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for a broader survey of social preferences and decision making.”