Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of Multinational Enterprises
By Igor Filatotchev, Mike Wright. 2011
225 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8e2c6f4f0e009095649ba1ffeffc74b50c1eb1bc
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Mike W. Peng
- K. Meyer
- Igor Filatotchev
- Mike Wright
- R. Hoskisson
- Xiaohui Liu
- Jiangyong Lu
- Saul Estrin
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Mike Wright
- Igor Filatotchev
- Mike W. Peng
- K. Meyer
- R. Hoskisson
- Saul Estrin
- Jiangyong Lu
- Roger Strange
Citations in the corpus
- Understanding Agency Problems in Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationships in Multinational Corporations: A Contextualized Model (2018, background): “…specificity (Hendry, 2002), and subsidiaries are left with substantial ambiguity as to their goals and mandates especially when less structured and standardized tasks, such as innovation, political activities, or adaptation of business models, are concerned (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Hendry).”
- Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “This has created an environment where there is no incentive for institutional investors to monitor management (Filatotchev and Wright, 2010) as well as little ability to generate the high returns that are usually associated with active management of funds.”
- Emerging multinationals from mid-range economies: the influence of institutions and factor markets (2013, background): “Filatotchev and Wright (2011), however, argue that it is becoming increasingly important to adopt an agency perspective that recognizes various dimensions of corporate governance.”
- Home country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis (2016, background): “Capital markets serve both as benchmarks to assess corporate performance and as the basis for incentive schemes such as stock option plans that help in aligning managerial objectives with those of private investors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011).”
- International experience and FDI location choices of Chinese firms: The moderating effects of home country government support and host country institutions (2014, background): “On the other hand, IB research based on various contingency models tended to focus on the moderating/mediating roles of firm-level characteristics, such as absorptive capacity or R&D intensity (Filatotchev & Piesse, 2009; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011).”
- Top executive compensation, regional institutions and Chinese OFDI (2014, background): “In particular, the increased complexity associated with the degree and scope of internationalization makes it difficult for the board to monitor senior executives (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011).”
- The Governance of the Multinational Enterprise: Insights from Internalization Theory (2011, background): “In this regard, there is scope for combining the insights of internalization theory with those of institutional analysis and agency theory, such as in the Counter–Point to this Point (Filatotchev and Wright, 2010).”
- Internal and External Corporate Governance: An Interface between an Organization and its Environment (2010, background): “As Filatotchev and Wright (2010) recognize, however, subsidiary managers may favour the interests of a local subsidiary rather than the overall interests of their firms.”