Corporate Governance in Italy

By A. Melis. 2000

161 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Corporate Governance Failures. To What Extent is Parmalat a Particularly Italian Case (2005, unknown): “Nevertheless, the agency problem is only shifted towards the relationship between different types of shareholders: the controlling shareholder and minority share- holders (La Porta et al ., 2000; Melis, 1999, 2000).”
Making Boards Effective: An Empirical Examination of Board Task Performance (2009, unknown): “In sum, the Italian governance system can be described as a system of ‘weak managers, strong blockholders and unprotected minority shareholders’ (Melis, 2000, p. 354).”
Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy? (2011, background): “…and Denmark, represents a good corporate governance practice because it separates management boards from supervisory boards, thereby diversifying control of corporate affairs and balancing the power of insiders (Franks, Mayer, & Wagner, 2006; Maassen & van den Bosch, 1999; Melis, 2000).”
The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform (2006, background): “The Italian case, in partial contrast, combined high levels of state ownership of financial institutions with a “familial” form of capitalism defined by tight networks of familycontrolled firms and conservative political elites.(13) Compared with France and Germany, the Italian political economy was”