The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform
176 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cf93d0540a9b5291afbfe6a2d0245b20d5e44173
How researchers see this paper
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In Finance
In Political Science and International Relations
- Ruth V. Aguilera
- Gregory Jackson
- Richard Deeg
- B. Amable
- Abdul Rasheed
- Toru Yoshikawa
- Michael A. Witt
- John H. Dunning
Citations in the corpus
- From comparing capitalisms to the politics of institutional change (2008, background): “…linking coalitions of stakeholders at the micro-level of the firm with the broader political processes and political institutions – especially the legislative and regulatory – shaping patterns of institutional change in national capitalisms (Callaghan and Höpner, 2005; Cioffi and Höpner, 2006).”
- Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Cioffi and Hopner ( 2006 ) also emphasize the possibility of “paradoxical” interest coalitions, whereby workers and center‐left parties become critical agents promoting shareholder‐oriented reforms.”