Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership

By M. Halonen. 2002

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8d15aebdfa3fec8711765200b9f1734ce195c4d0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Jonathan D. Levin
2. C. Ménard
3. Jonathan Zinman

In Economics and Econometrics

1. C. Ménard
2. Jonathan D. Levin
3. W. Buhr
4. Ron Siegel
5. Cristiano Antonelli
6. Jean Tirole
7. Jonathan Zinman
8. M. Warner

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Jonathan D. Levin
2. C. Ménard
3. W. Buhr
4. Cristiano Antonelli

Citations in the corpus

• Hybrid Modes of Organization. Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other 'Strange' Animals (2013, background): “Halonen (2002) extended the Grossman-Hart-Moore model (see Hart & Moore 1990) to cases in which it could be optimal to share some rights, butit is not clear if we end up with a different governance structure or simply a distinct sharing rule.”
• Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2008, unknown): “Halonen (2002) considers a repeated relationship.”
• Relational Incentive Contracts (2003, background): “In Halonen (2002), both parties make their quality decisions simultaneously, these are observed by the other party, and either or both can be applied to an asset.”