Outcome bias in decision evaluation.

By J. Baron, J. Hershey. 1988

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Citations in the corpus

Conducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (2011, unknown): “The studies they replicated were the “Asian disease” problem to test framing e ﬀ ects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the “Linda” problem to test the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), and the “physician” problem to test outcome bias (Baron & Hershey, 1988).”
When good decisions have bad outcomes: The impact of affect on switching behavior (2005, background): “For example, people rate others as better thinkers, more competent, and having engaged in better decision making when their decisions have a favorable outcome (Alicke, Davis, & Pezzo, 1994; Allison, Mackie, & Messick, 1996; Baron & Hershey, 1988).”
Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (2010, background): “The physician problem (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Experiment 1, Cases 1 and 2) demonstrates the outcome bias, the fact that stated judgments of quality of a decision often depend on the valence of the outcome.”
The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games (2001, background): “15Baron and Hershey (1988) discuss a related phenomenon known as outcome bias: When subjects are asked to rate the quality of thinking behind a decision made by others under conditions of uncertainty, they”
Regret, Portfolio Choice, and Guarantees in Defined Contribution Schemes (2006, methodology): “Behavior compatible with such a preference structure has been observed in many contexts, where it often explains deviations from expected utility models traditionally used in the finance and insurance literature (cf Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Loomes,1988; Baron and Hershey, 1988; Loomes et al. 1992; S”
Heuristics and Biases: Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? (2002, unknown): “A measure of outcome bias modeled on the work of Baron and Hershey (1988).”
Counterfactuals , Causal Attributions , and the Hindsight Bias : A Conceptual Integration (1996, background): “Our perspective applies to cases in which a formal decision was made and then followed by (perhaps negative) consequences (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Gleicher et al. 1990), but also to cases in which actors make no explicit decisions and are not even cognizant of any alternative possibilities at the…”
No Harm, No Foul: The Outcome Bias in Ethical Judgments (2009, unknown): “Prior research on the use of outcome information focused on its effects on decision quality and evaluations of the individual making the decision (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Hershey & Baron, 1992).”
Causes of ambiguity aversion: Known versus unknown preferences (2008, background): “Home-bias JEL classification C91, D81, Z13 In decision under uncertainty people have been found to prefer options involving clear probabilities (risk) to options involving vague probabilities (ambiguity), even if normative theory (Savage 1954) implies indifference.”
Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm (2017, background): “Nonetheless, the influence of outcomes on moral judgements persists even for adults (e.g., Baron & Hershey, 1988; Cushman, 2008; Robinson, Goodwin, & Reisig, 2010; Walster, 1966).”
Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior (2010, methodology): “Extending prior work in behavioral ethics and decision making, our research examines the effects of the identifiability of victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b; Small & Loewenstein, 2003, 2005) and the effects of outcome information (Baron & Hershey, 1988) in ethical contexts.”
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (2011, methodology): “Our measure of outcome bias derived from a pr1oblem investigated by Baron and Hershey (1988) , and was composed of two parts presented separately in the battery of measures.”
The role of probability of success estimates in the sunk cost effect (2000, unknown): “This is the usual outcome bias (Baron and Hershey, 1988).”