Counterfactuals , Causal Attributions , and the Hindsight Bias : A Conceptual Integration

By Dave Hamilton, Dale T. Miller, M. Ross, R. Sorrentino, Yaacov Trope, E. Pena. 1996

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Citations in the corpus

On formalizing fairness in prediction with machine learning (2017, background): “There has been research to indicate that counterfactual reasoning is susceptible to hindsight bias (34; 38) and outcome bias (i.”
Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations (2006, background): “But it remains unknown whether people focus more on exceptional antecedents when they spontaneously generate counterfactual thoughts (Roese & Olson, 1996, 1997).”
An investigation of hindsight bias in nascent venture activity (2009, background): “We argue that hindsight bias will lead to individuals superimposing their recollections of previous experiences so that it makes sense when evaluating future startup prospects (Roese & Olson, 1996).”
Event detail and confidence in gambling: The role of counterfactual thought reactions (2010, background): “ Roese and Olson (1996) further suggest that counterfactual thoughts help one to develop a causal attribution for the outcome.”
Sensemaking in Crisis and Change: Inspiration and Insights from Weick (1988) (2010, background): “While sensemaking can diminish the emotional power of events (Roese and Olson, 1996; Wilson and Gilbert, 2005), in many emotion-laden crisis and change situations, people struggle to make meaning of what is happening.”
The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking (2008, background): “Similarly, counterfactual thinking can increase hindsight bias, a form of retrospective overconfidence (Roese, 2004; Roese & Maniar, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1996; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002), although this effect has yet to be connected to behavioral effects.”
Depression, Control, and Counterfactual Thinking: Functional for Whom? (2006, unknown): “1995), and certainty–of–hindsight (Roese & Olson, 1996).”
Connecting Scientific Reasoning and Causal Inference (2004, methodology): “Similarly, models of counterfactual reasoning (Roese & Olson, 1996) rely on comparison of probabilities under two conditions (in which an event does or does not occur), whereas Bayesian net mod- els (Glymour, 2001) also emphasize prior probabilities as constraining computations of causal power.”
Counterfactuals as behavioral primes: Priming the simulation heuristic and consideration of alternatives. (2000, background): “... consequences: (a) amplification of emotion (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Macrae & Milne, 1992), (b) altered judgments of causality (Wells & Gavanski, 1989, but see Mandel & Lehman, 1996, for a distinction between causal attribution and counterfactual thinking), (c) increased victim compensation awar”
The Dissatisfaction of Having Your First Offer Accepted: The Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Negotiations (2002, background): “Counterfactual thinking has been shown to affect a wide variety of judgments—from causal judgments (Wells & Gavanski, 1989) to victim compensation awards (Miller & McFarland, 1986) to exacerbations of the hindsight bias ( Roese & Olson, 1996 ).”