Boards of directors, ownership, and regulation

By James R. Booth, Marcia Millon Cornett, Hassan Tehranian. 2002

350 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/857187d8886db3eb523b3867b7e8c2d0c02036f6

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Hamid Mehran
2. Renée B. Adams
3. Hanoku Bathula
4. N. Amran
5. M. Belkhir
6. E. O. Akpan
7. Shams Pathan
8. M. Skully

In Finance

1. Hamid Mehran
2. Renée B. Adams
3. Hanoku Bathula
4. N. Amran
5. M. Belkhir
6. Shams Pathan
7. M. Skully
8. Tasawar Nawaz

Citations in the corpus

• Institutional ownership stability and BHC performance (2008, neutral): “, Booth et al. (2002), have suggested that the relationship between regulation and market discipline is one of substitution, rather than complementarity.”
• Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Evidence from New Zealand (2011, background): “Further, Booth et al. (2002) posit that CEO/Chair duality and director ownership are actually substitutes for each other, along with outside directors and regulations, for monitoring the divergence between managers and stockholders. Peasnell et al. (2003) also find substitution between managerial ow”
• Board structure, ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from banking (2009, positive): “It adds to the studies of Schranz (1993) and Booth et al. (2002) in two ways.”
• Board of Directors' Size and Performance in the Banking Industry (2009, background): “The average board size is much smaller than the average board size reported by Booth et al. (2002)”
• The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison (2010, neutral): “In addition, 1 See, for example, Booth et al. (2002), Brickley et al. (1988), Cornett et al. (2003), Denis and Denis (1994), Fama and Jensen (1983), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Mehran (1995), Morck et al. (1988), and Stulz (1988, 1990).”
• Bank Board Structure and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies (2011, background): “As a result, we know very little about the effectiveness of banking firm governance.3 But it has arguably never been as important to understand the governance of banking firms as it is now following the subprime mortgage crisis.”
• Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation (2005, neutral): “consistent with Booth et al. (2002). Industrial firms have a larger proportion of inside directors,”
• Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies? (Part 2: The Governance of Banks) (2003, neutral): “…in S&P manufacturing firms, where the mean percentage is 60.6 percent (median: 66.7 percent).23 The mean percentage of outside and “gray” directors in 1999, 81.6 percent (median: 83.3 percent), is almost the same as what is reported in Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) for the 100 largest BHCs.”
• Board characteristics and company performance: Evidence from Nigeria (2014, background): “When directors own shares in the company, they will like to take actions that will increase both their wealth and that of the shareholders (Booth et al., 2002).”
• Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, neutral): “Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) provide evidence that regulation can substitute for internal monitoring mechanisms.”