Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds

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Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? (2008, background): “One answer is that they come from a process of cognitive simulation (e.g. Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Byrne, 2005; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982b; Nichols and Stich, 2003; Oatley, 1999).”
Defining features versus incidental correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 processing (2012, methodology): “At a certain level of development, decoupling becomes used for so-called meta-representation—thinking about thinking itself (see Dennett 1984; Nichols and Stich 2003; Sperber 2000; Sterelny 2003).”
Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look (2008, background): “…that meta-cognitive processes concerning the thoughts, goals, and likely behavior of others is cognitively extremely demanding (Wellman, 1990; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gopnik and Melzoff, 1997; Nichols and Stich, 2003), and some maintain that it may even be confined to human beings (Povinelli, 2000).”
The reasoning skills and thinking dispositions of problem gamblers: a dual‐process taxonomy (2007, background): “The analytic system is responsible for the ability to create temporary models of the world and test the outcomes of imaginary actions (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Evans & Over, 1999, 2004; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Sterelny, 2001).”