Corporate Boards in OECD Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning and Effectiveness

By Pablo de Andrés, V. Azofra, Félix A. López. 2005

711 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/815389152db9835fed9761cbd56154adb93b8a7c

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the Board of Directors (2008, result): “…respectively, which is higher than the average board size (12) reported for non-financial firms (Yermack, 1996; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Klein, 1998; Vafeas, 1999; Andres et al., 2005), but close to the 17 directors obtained by Adams and Mehran (2005) in the period 1995– 1999 for banks.”
Corporate governance and strategic information on the internet (2011, background): “(1998) and Andres et al. (2005), have found that the presence of a higher number of Board members would lead to less effectiveness of the Board in terms of management control, as a result of increased agency problems and a likely decrease in Board agility and reaction capability.”
East Meets West? Board Characteristics in an Emerging Market: Evidence from Turkish Banks (2008, background): “Last, a recent survey of 450 nonfinancial firms from 10 OECD countries (De Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 2005) uncover that oversized boards have poorer performance on three different financial measures.”
Audit committee characteristics and firm performance during the global financial crisis (2012, neutral): “…over the test period, goes some way to addressing the endogeneity problems often cited in governance research (Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Black et al. 2006; Brown et al. 2011; De Andres et al. 2005; Dwivedi and Jain 2005; Miller et al. 2007; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Schultz et al. 2010; Welch 2003).”
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: Jordanian Evidence (2011, background): “ISSN 1913-9004 E-ISSN 1913-9012 218 environment for examination. Hence, several hypotheses are developed that identify and link specific elements of governance to earnings management. 2.1 Percent of Independent Outside Directors on the Board There is a considerable literature regarding the effect of”
Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China (2009, background): “On the other hand, several empirical findings point out that the size of a board is negatively correlated to firm performance (Ees, Postma, & Sterken, 2003; Yermack, 1996), especially an oversized board (Andres et al., 2005).”
The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance (2007, background): “Johnson et al. (1996), Bhagat and Black (1999), and De Andres et al. (2005) conclude similarly.”
Does corporate governance affect Australian banks' performance? (2016, methodology): “Some studies found positive relations between this governance variable and operating performance (see inter alia Hossain et al., 2001; Bushman et al., 2004; de Andres et al., 2005; Cornett et al., 2007; Doucouliagos et al., 2007; Dahya et al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2009).”
The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK (2009, methodology): “…to overcome these problems by employing instrumental variable techniques (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Postma et al., 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2005; de Andres et al., 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; and Bennedsen et al., 2008), and as shown in Table 1, the results suggest that there is causality from…”
Composition and Activity of the Board of Directors: Impact on ESG Performance in the Banking System (2018, background): “…and collective decision-making process along with the agency perspective, smaller boards are expected to be more effective at monitoring and controlling in ﬁrm governance than larger boards [42,60,73,74] and better able to mitigate managers’ opportunistic behavior to the detriment of shareholders.”
Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, background): “(2011) in Brazil, find that if the size of the Board is very small, the monitoring of the management team is smaller too, so they tend towards greater discretion in receiving higher remuneration, a greater chance of EM and are more prone to information asymmetry (Fernandez 1998; Azofra et al. 2005; ”