Founding‐Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage*

By Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb. Journal law and economy, 2003

711 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/814acc86266ea08c63e1323de2040c2c7b3b8f01

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Citations in the corpus

Diversification Decisions in Family-Controlled Firms (2010, neutral): “instance, Anderson & Reeb, 2003 ), there has been little empirical research on how family”
What do we know about Private Family Firms? A Meta–Analytical Review (2015, background): “…on the value of publicly listed family firms is somewhat divided, there is growing support for the view that, despite the risk of expropriation, a public listing in a well-regulated capital market is “an effective organizational structure” (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b, p. 680; Van Essen et al., 2010).”
Ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structure decisions of firms: Empirical evidence from Ghana (2009, background): “Introduction The relevance of capital structure to firm value remains fairly established following the seminal article by Modigliani and Miller, 1958 (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; McCabe, 1979; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).”
In the Horns of the Dilemma: Socioemotional Wealth, Financial Wealth, and Acquisitions in Family Firms (2018, methodology): “Drawing on Anderson and Reeb (2003), we identify outside blockholders who control Gomez-Mejia et al. / Behavioral Theory of the Firm 1381 more than 5% of equity but are not family members.”
Family Firms and Debt: Risk Aversion versus Risk of Losing Control (2013, result): “Consistent with the empirical literature regarding family firms and capital structure (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller, Le Breton–Miller, Lester and Cannella, 2007; or Brenes, Madrigal and Requena, 2010) the model introduces several control variables.”
Complementarity in Monitoring and Bonding: More Intense Monitoring Leads to Higher Executive Compensation (2009, background): “Without the ability to diversify the firm as highly, managers face higher employment risk (i.e., risk is shifted to managers), as represented by the lower dashed line under the Managers curve in the lower right quadrant of Figure 2 (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).”
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth (2005, neutral): “Anderson and Reeb (2003a) use the same sample and find that family controlled firms are less diversified, after controlling for size, outside directors, and block shareholders.”
Family involvement and firms’ establishment mode choice in foreign markets (2016, background): “Specifically, while FFs use similar levels of debt as non-FFs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), they have been found to be more prone to relying on internal rather than external funds (Caprio et al., 2011).”
Investment policy in family controlled firms (2012, background): “In additional analysis, we examine whether active family management (founder CEO, descendant CEO) versus passive family management (outside, professional CEO) exhibits an incremental influence on firm investment decisions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).”
Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis (2012, background): “Finally, family-controlled firms rely less on external financing (β = −.12, p .01), as family-controlled firms prefer financing forms that are associated with low probabilities of default (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).”
Corporate divestitures and family control (2016, background): “, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), particularly with regard to maintaining their firms’ diversification levels (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010).”
Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms (2007, neutral): “Considering only S&P 500 firms has the benefit of 6 BusinessWeek adopts this definition of family firms from Anderson and Reeb (2003a).”
Family-firm risk-taking: Does religion matter? (2015, neutral): “For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) contend that some family-firms care about enhancing their”