Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions

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Institutions, ownership structures, and distress resolution in China☆ (2013, background): “…Baird et al. (2007), Brealey and Mye Stromberg (2000), Thorburn (2000), Weiss (1990), W 2 Dahiya et al. (2003), Pulvino (1999), Shleifer and 3 Eckbo and Thorburn (2003), Gilson (1997), Hotch 0929-1199/$ – see front matter © 2013 Published by…”
Reconceptualizing entrepreneurial exit : divergent exit routes and their drivers (2010, unknown): “In an earlier study of bankruptcies, in 90% of the cases the firm, rather than creditors, filed the application (Thorburn, 2000), and a majority of firms re-appear after the bankruptcy settlement freed from debts, often under the same CEO (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003).”
Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking (2009, unknown): “Gilson (1989), Baird and Rasmussen (2006) and Ozelge (2007) find that upon distress, there is a significantly higher probability of top-management dismissal, especially due to direct intervention by lending banks, compared to firms not in distress.”
Disentangling compensation and employment risks using the behavioral agency model (2007, background): “, stock options) effectively aligns CEO and shareholders’ interests. However, it is a long leap from observing wealth preservation to attributing intentions of wealth maximization. Furthermore, Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989), Lavelle et al.”
Cash Holdings and Credit Risk (2012, unknown): “17 18”