Information and Control in Ventures and Alliances
By Wouter Dessein. 2005
141 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f2c306a2465bdf9cd1024718b1502c8a0641891
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Steven N. Kaplan
- F. Martel
- Per Strömberg
- Matthew J. Higgins
- J. Adegbesan
- Douglas J. Cumming
- Armin Schwienbacher
- David H. Hsu
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Steven N. Kaplan
- F. Martel
- Per Strömberg
- Matthew J. Higgins
- J. Adegbesan
- Junfu Zhang
- Holger M. Müller
- Roman Inderst
Citations in the corpus
- Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts (2010, unknown): “There is no direct efficiency loss as in the moral hazard problem, but the adverse selection problem increases the probability of costly renegotiation in the long term, and the higher borrowing costs might leave positive NPV project unfunded.(16) In incomplete contracts, contracting usefulness of ac”
- The Intra-Alliance Division of Value Created through Collaboration (2011, background): “forth (cf. Ariño and Reuer, 2005; Dessein, 2005; Oxley, 1997), we hold that PS control rights are those most closely related to intra-alliance value division.”
- How Do Legal Differences and Experience Affect Financial Contracts (2007, background): “Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004) also show that the characteristics of US VC contracts are consistent with the contracts predicted by financial contracting theories such as Aghion and Bolton (1992), Dessein (2005), and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).”
- Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants (2009, unknown): “Most closely related in this regard is a recent paper by Dessein. Dessein (2004) also considers the assignment of control rights under asymmetric information, applied in his setting to a contract between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist.”
- The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (2015, unknown): “Thus, borrowers concede strong ex ante decision rights throughout the lending relationship, as suggested by Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009) and Dessein (2005).”