Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

By Matthew Embrey, Guillaume R. Fréchette, S. Yuksel. 2018

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/576325f9af53fb05be35d05dc6b41c0fd242c59a

Citations in the corpus

• Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination (2016, unknown): “See Embrey et al. (2016) for a review of behavior in finitely repeated PDs.”
• On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, unknown): “Unlike most papers in this literature, Embrey et al. [2013] include a structured, nonbinding communication protocol through which agents can agree to an action combination or to a conditional action plan – of the type, do this now then if the project is a success we do this, if the project is a fail”