The Demand for Tax Haven Operations

By Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines. 2006

600 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c13b330cab3374c01866a53932c37b2ad804ab8d

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Financial Constraints on Income Shifting by U.S. Multinationals (2016, background): “Furthermore, Desai et al. (2006) find that firms with a greater degree of multinationality, more extensive intrafirm trade, and more intense research and development activities have more operations in tax haven countries.”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “6 Desai et al.(2006) delineate between tax haven countries associated with tax benefits, but few operational benefits (i.”
Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms (2011, background): “Supporting this line of argumentation, recent papers relate profit shifting activities to intangible asset ownership (e.g. Grubert, 2003 or Desai et al., 2006) as arm’s length prices for firm–specific intellectual property rights are hard to determine for tax authorities.”
Seeking Shelter: Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information (2010, unknown): “One potential explanation for the lack of results is that the Frank et al. (2009) measure is based on a broader effective tax rate differential, which includes more than permanent book-tax income differences, such as tax credits (Hanlon and Heitzman 2009), while tax shelters have also been found to ”
Does a common set of accounting standards affect tax-motivated income shifting for multinational firms? (2016, background): “Desai et al. (2006) examine cross-sectional determinants of the use of tax havens to shift income.”
Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multinational Firms: Issues and Options for Reform (2013, unknown): “27 Desai et al. (2006).”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “, jurisdictions typically characterized as providing tax rather than operational benefits, [Desai et al. 2006]).”
Earnings Shocks and Tax-Motivated Income-Shifting: Evidence from European Multinationals (2012, unknown): “36 Desai et al. (2006) find that U.S. multinationals that are larger in size, have more opportunities for tradewithin theMNE, and higher R&D intensity aremore likely to have tax haven affiliates.”
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE: A REVIEW OF THE CHANNELS, MAGNITUDES, AND BLIND SPOTS (2018, unknown): “6 As there is often no comparable transactions of IPs between unrelated parties, determining the arm’s length price for company’s intangible transactions is usually very difficult, leaving room for tax-induced manipulation of transfer prices (see, e.g., Grubert, 2003; Desai et al., 2006).”
The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Captial, Firms and Profit: a Survey of Empirical Evidence (2007, methodology): “Desai et al (2001, 2006) reinvestigate the basic issue of the impact of taxes on dividend repatriations using not tax return data, but the confidential individual data underlying the BEA aggregate data.”