R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation

By Shijun Cheng. 2004

522 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7dc601b58d30efca42ab427c78236540533430ce

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Citations in the corpus

East, West, Home's Best: Do Local CEOs Behave Less Myopically? (2019, unknown): “Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Cheng (2004) find evidence suggesting that equity incentives can align managers’ interest with that of shareholders and, accordingly, reduce managers’ tendencies to engage in short-term decisions.”
CEO Tenure and Earnings Management (2015, unknown): “…also predict that CEOs overstate earnings in their final year of service in order to boost their final year's pay; although, extant empirical evidence related to this prediction is mixed (see e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Pourciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Cheng, 2004; Kalyta, 2009).”
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, background): “Hence, stock exchanges in US, UK, and elsewhere require listed firms to include a certain proportion of independent directors on a compensation committee to control managers’ selfinterest, such as overpaying themselves and reducing R&D expenditures (Cheng, 2004 68 ).”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, unknown): “Prior studies (e.g., Cheng 2004; Bushee 1998; Barber et al. 1991) define such cases as firms whose pre-tax earnings fall short of a benchmark by an amount that can be bridged by Table 2 continued Dependent variable (1) Appoint expert (2) Appoint expert (3) At least 1 board expert (4) #Board…”
Myopic Marketing Management: Evidence of the Phenomenon and Its Long-Term Performance Consequences in the SEO Context (2007, unknown): “For example, Cheng (2004) showed that CEO compensation committees are”
Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure (2008, unknown): “, 2000; Garcia Osma and Gill-de-Albornoz Noguer, 2007); and (ii) real earnings management actions that affect the activities of the company, such as timing the sale of assets (Bartov, 1993) or manipulating R&D expenditures (Bushee, 1998; Cheng, 2004).”
R&D Expenditure and Earnings Targets (2009, unknown): “The contemporaneous association between target earnings performance and R&D is examined using the procedure employed by Baber et al. (1991), Perry and Grinaker (1994), Bushee (1998), Cheng (2004) and Oswald and Zarowin (2007b).”
Research and Development, Cash Flow, Agency and Governance: UK large companies (2012, background): “Since R&D usually has lengthy pay-back periods, involves the uncertain role of absorptive capacity building, and is characterised by high idiosyncratic risk, there is an a-priori expectation of underinvestment by managers that governance needs to assess (Eisenhardt 1998; Hall 1990; Cheng 2004).”
Does Hiring a New CFO Change Things? An Investigation of Changes in Discretionary Accruals (2006, background): “Additionally, leaving or retiring CFOs have similar and often heightened incentives to maximize corporate profits and their salaries in the years immediately preceding their retirement or departure (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Cheng 2004).”
The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks*: Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance (2009, unknown): “Cheng (2004) provides evidence consistent with compensation committees mitigating opportunistic reductions in R&D spending.”
Horizon problem and firm innovation: The influence of CEO career horizon, exploitation and exploration on breakthrough innovations (2017, background): “…a CEO’s career horizon significantly affects such risky strategies as acquisitions (Matta and Beamish, 2008), research and development (R & D) (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Zona, 2016), capital expenditures (Cheng, 2004; Dechow and Sloan, 1991), and corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Kang, 2015).”
The impact of SME’s pre-bankruptcy financial distress on earnings management tools (2015, background): “…based on firms’ choices that affect the real conduct of the business and its cash-flows, for example reducing research and development expenses (i.e. Cheng, 2004; Dechow & Sloan, 1991), altering production output (e.g. Baber, Fairfield, & Haggard, 1991; Perry & Grinaker, 1994), cutting advertising…”
Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies (2012, unknown): “While he was well beyond the typical retirement age of 64 (Murphy, 1999; Cheng, 2004), his tenure at GM is less than one year.”
What are the consequences of real earnings management (2005, background): “Cheng (2003) provides evidence consistent with compensation committees mitigating opportunistic reductions in R&D spending.”