The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks*: Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance

By Katherine A. Gunny. 2009

1,385 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3215a04ec50b94d847a62a92c9ad4f82de2fc7d3

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In Accounting

1. Thomas C. Omer
2. Li Sun
3. Qiang Cheng
4. Xuerong Huang
5. Jimmy Lee
6. Terry Shevlin
7. Nathan Y. Sharp
8. Bill Francis

In Management Information Systems

1. A. Parbonetti
2. Nathan Y. Sharp
3. Mohammad Alhadab
4. Muhammad Jahangir Ali
5. Elisabetta Ipino
6. Rushdi Md. Rezaur Razzaque
7. Paul R. Mather
8. Qiang Cheng

Citations in the corpus

• Real earnings management in family firms: Evidence from an emerging economy (2016, methodology): “However, Gunny (2010) shows that firms that engage in REMs to meet earnings benchmark demonstrate better future performance compared to firms that do not engage in REMs and miss the earnings benchmark by reasonable margin.”
• Real and accrual earnings management and IPO failure risk (2015, background): “There is a growing body of research that shows that firms engage extensively in real earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al. 2008, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012), notably during the IPO year to manage reported earnings upward (Darrough and Rangan 2005, Singer and Fedyk 2011, Wongsunwai 2012).”
• The impact of SME’s pre-bankruptcy financial distress on earnings management tools (2015, neutral): “Gunny (2010) states that managers may prefer real activity management over accruals manipulation because, for example, accounting standards setters are making accruals more difficult to manipulate and because auditors exercise a closer monitoring over accruals.”
• Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, positive): “Following 8 As before, we include an intercept in Equations (3) to (5), following Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010); our results remain qualitatively similar if we exclude the intercept.”
• Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management (2016, background): “7 In contrast, Gunny (2010) finds that firms engaging in real earnings management to report small positive earnings exhibit better subsequent performance and she attributes this result to the signaling role of real earnings management.”
• Stock price crash risk: review of the empirical literature (2018, neutral): “However, a value-enhancing perspective of REM finds that current-period REM improves subsequent performance (Gunny, 2010).”
• Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management (2017, background): “Gunny (2010) provides three reasons for a firm to prefer real to accrual-based earnings management: (1) aggressive accrual-based earnings management may result in subsequent regulatory scrutiny and litigation; (2) managers have limited flexibility in managing earnings to report discretionary…”
• The Impact of Leverage on Real Earnings Management (2013, neutral): “This result was consistent with Gunny, 2010.”
• The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting Irregularities (2012, positive): “Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010), we include an indicator variable for firms that either report a small profit (i.”
• The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management (2017, neutral): “In relation to the forms that EM can take, past research has considered that RM is harder to track and scrutinise for outside parties, for example, auditors or regulators, in comparison to AM (Cohen et al. 2008, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012).”