Instrument Choice for Environmental Protection When Technological Innovation is Endogenous

By C. Fischer, Ian W. H. Parry, William A. Pizer. 2003

468 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7d1686ee72e408fa6bdaabd715b2acb58eacd190

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Renewable Energy Policies and Technological Innovation: Evidence Based on Patent Counts (2008, unknown): “First raised by Downing and White (1986) , to our knowledge this issue has not been examined empirically.”
Increasing Energy and Resource Efficiency Through Innovation - An Explorative Analysis Using Innovation Survey Data (2009, unknown): “According to Fischer et al., 2003, the welfare gain of environmental policy instruments critically depends on the circumstances involved.”
Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy, Adoption of New Technology, and Repercussions on R&D (2005, background): “Fisher et al. (2003) study a model with only one innovator but no adoption by other firms.”
The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards (2006, background): “See, for example, Milliman and Prince [26], Biglaiser and Horowitz [4], Jung et al. [15] and Fischer et al. [8].”
The innovation effects of environmental policy instruments — A typical case of the blind men and the elephant? (2011, background): “For instance the study by Fischer et al. (2003) found that no unequivocal ranking was possible between pollution taxes, auctioned permits and free (grandfathered) permits.”
Demand-pull and technology-push public support for eco-innovation: The case of the biofuels sector (2015, background): “Different studies have highlighted the difficulties in ranking price-based and quantity-based instruments with regard to their effectiveness in spurring eco-innovation (Fischer et al., 2003; Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011; Requate, 2005; Veugelers, 2012).”
Designing Climate Mitigation Policy (2010, unknown): “…subsidies 27 Studies that compare R&D incentives under alternative emissions control policies (e.g., Milliman and Prince 1989; Jung et al. 1996; Fischer et al. 2003) find relatively little difference between (equivalently scaled) emissions taxes and permit systems, so long as the potential for…”
Rebating Environmental Policy Revenues: Output-Based Allocations and Tradable Performance Standards (2001, unknown): “20See Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (1998).”
Environmental and climate innovation: Limitations, policies and prices (2013, background): “undertake innovation/adoption, and increase their abatement level (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Fischer et al., 2003).”
Does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption? When the rate of technology adoption is inverted u-shaped (2012, background): “…“technology diffusion presumably lowers the aggregate marginal abatement cost function” (p. 54), and this assumption is also made by Milliman and Prince (1989), Jung et al. (1996), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Fischer et al. (2003), Requate and Unold (2001, 2003), Rosendahl (2004), Requate…”
The empirical analysis of the determinants for environmental technological change: A research agenda (2009, background): “However, the recent Environmental Economics literature is inconclusive about this theoretical superiority (see Requate, 2005; Driesen, 2003; Fisher et al., 1998 ).”
Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation (2008, background): “Do firms in the sector recognize the impact of their innovation decisions on future prices? Do they myopically expect prices to remain unchanged? Or do they expect the future prices, taking them as given, as do competitive firms? A long literature recognizes that innovation incentives differ, depend”