Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

By George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson. 2006

427 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/795db31d5067bf3fa6bb3c9f09e107e5fdb7e354

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Citations in the corpus

The Power of Shame and the Rationality of Trust (2007, background): “This is particularly true if one considers repeated games of incomplete information with imperfect monitoring (see, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson, 2006), the latter being the case when a player’s digression cannot easily be detected by his counterparts.”
Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?☆☆☆ (2009, background): “For example the title of the article by Mason and Rosner (2007) is self explanatory: How misapplied bond ratings cause mortgage backed securities and C.”
A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification (2008, unknown): “The following example shows a finite state strategy equilibrium; see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for additional details.”
Reputation and Status as Motives for War (2014, background): “For a review of the (formal) strategic logic of reputation, see Mailath & Samuelson (2006).”
Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time (2007, unknown): “SpringerVerlag, New York, 1991 [15] Mailath G.”
On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, background): “Without going into details, let us highlight some of the well known results from this literature (see Mailath and Samuelson [2006] for a survey).”
Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination (2016, unknown): “In fact, depending on the paper and the application, one (or both) interpretation has been given (see Mailath and Samuelson [2006] section 4).”
Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics (2011, background): “See, for example, the proof of Theorem 1 in Rosenthal (1979).”
The Career Effects of Scandal: Evidence from Scientific Retractions (2017, unknown): “Within the economics literature, the existing theoretical research is concerned with how, and under what conditions, economic agents acquire a good (or a bad) one, and more generally, how they influence the beliefs of the market about their innate type (Mailath & Samuelson 2006).”