Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?☆☆☆
By J. Mathis, James McAndrews, Jean-Charles Rochet. 2009
571 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9bafccf81eae3cd78a95726bb062ed11155f7e73
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Citations in the corpus
- Ratings Quality Over the Business Cycle (2013, background): “…equilibrium where the CRA tells the truth in every period exists and demonstrate that truthtelling incentives are weaker when the CRA has more business from rating complex products.4 Strausz (2005) is similar in structure to Mathis et al. (2009), but examines information intermediaries in general.”
- The Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings (2014, unknown): “Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) examine the incentives of a credit rating agency to inflate its ratings in a dynamic model of endogenous reputation acquisition.”
- Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options (2010, unknown): “Such rating inflation may have resulted from collusion between CRAs and issuers at the expense of investors, as highlighted by Bolton et al. (2009) and Mathis et al. (2009).”
- Rating Shopping or Catering? An Examination of the Response to Competitive Pressure for CDO Credit Ratings (2013, unknown): “Reputational concern, a commonly cited incentive, is not always sufficient for rating agencies to report truthfully even in theory (Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009)).”
- Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage-Backed Securities (2012, unknown): “Shopping may thus lead to inflated ratings (e.g., Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009)).”
- What Have They Been Thinking? Home Buyer Behavior in Hot and Cold Markets (2012, unknown): “…with rents (Brunnermeier and Julliard 2008, along lines exposited by Modigliani and Cohn 1979 for the stock market); an agency problem afflicting the credit rating agencies (Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet 2009); and government failure to regulate an emerging shadow banking system (Gorton 2010).”