Activist arbitrage: A study of open-ending attempts of closed-end funds
By M. Bradley, Alon Brav, Itay Goldstein, Wei Jiang. 2010
154 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/768d833a1277d19aba53faca1ab09db9b3e33d49
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alex Edmans
- Itay Goldstein
- Ian R. Appel
- Todd A. Gormley
- Donald B. Keim
- Wei Jiang
- Caroline Flammer
- George Serafeim
In Finance
- Alex Edmans
- Itay Goldstein
- Todd A. Gormley
- Ian R. Appel
- Donald B. Keim
- Wei Jiang
- Caroline Flammer
- Thierry Foucault
Citations in the corpus
- The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model (2013, unknown): “Ui2(continue) = c2 + pi2 iVi + (1 pi2)max f iMi; c3 + pi3 iVi + (1 pi3) iMig (3)”
- Corporate governance and hedge fund activism (2011, unknown): “Bradley et al. (2009) examine hedge fund activism designed to open closed end funds.”
- Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, unknown): “The third set of events includes activism targeting issues related to business strategy, such as operational efficiency, business restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, and growth strategies.”
- Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “Second, the size and concentration of passive investors’ ownership stakes may facilitate activist investors’ efforts to rally support for their demands (Brav et al. (2008), Bradley et al.”
- Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “Bradley et al. (2010) show that activist institutions successfully force closed-end funds to open end, thereby creating value through the elimination of the closed-end fund discount.”
- Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism (2016, unknown): “The large and concentrated ownership stakes of passive institutions might help overcome this problem by facilitating activist investors’ ability to rally support for their demands (Brav et al., 2008; Bradley et al., 2010) and by decreasing the coordination costs of activism (e.”
- Governance and Taxes: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity (2016, unknown): “2 Some of these papers exclusively investigate the effect of quasi-index investors, which they define using the investor classifications in Bushee (2001), available on Brian Bushee’s website at: http://acct.”
- The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers (2012, background): “We also delete bids where the acquirer had a stake exceeding 50% before the acquisition, or a final holding of under 50%.”