The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: some thoughts and clarifications

By Lee Cronk. 2005

115 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental Biology, Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75231d3744720abe3fa0d0099e4dee6ce9f632da

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In Developmental Biology

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Citations in the corpus

The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment (2008, unknown): “001 unobservable traits by behaving altruistically (Bliege Bird & Smith, 2005; Cronk, 2005; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997), making them attractive mates, allies, or partners.”
Social benefits of luxury brands as costly signals of wealth and status (2011, background): “Costly signaling theory has been successfully applied as an account of wasteful displays in animal — including human — behavior (e.g., Bliege Bird & Smith, 2005; Cronk, 2005).”
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology (2007, background): “…are numerous concepts such as indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sig-mund 2005; Nowak 2006), byproduct mutualism (Dugatkin 2002; Sachs et al. 2004), and costly signaling (Lachmann et al. 2001; Cronk 2005) that claim to explain the evolution of cooperation and altruism without invoking group selection.”
Evolutionary accounts of belief in supernatural punishment: a critical review (2011, background): “Contrary to some accounts, they are not isomorphic: not all costly signals are reliable and not all reliable signals are costly (Cronk, 2005).”
What is bullying? A theoretical redefinition. (2014, background): “Instead, we draw upon evolutionary signaling theory (Cronk, 2005; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997) to suggest the counter-intuitive proposal that when a bully is striving for dominance, he or she is sending a signal to the peer group, and consequently the bullying transcends the dyadic bully–victim…”
Human prosociality from an evolutionary perspective: variation and correlations at a city-wide scale ☆ (2009, background): “Numerous possibilities have been suggested, including indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987), honest signaling (Cronk, 2005), low-cost social control (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Sober & Wilson, 1998) and cultural transmission mechanisms that increase phenotypic variation among groups (Richerson & Boyd,”