The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist Societies
By Neil Fligstein. 2001
1,457 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73bd0f4b174ec89e44633b271bfe3d8232d1b529
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In Economics and Econometrics
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In Sociology and Political Science
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Citations in the corpus
- The Organization of Markets (2015, methodology): “A high degree of competition is a key source of uncertainty for sellers and buyers (Fligstein, 2001).”
- Culture, meaning, and institutions: Executive rationale in Germany and Japan (2009, positive): “across different capitalist economies systems (e.g., Lazonick, 1991; Orrù, Biggart, and Hamilton, 1997; Whitley, 1999; Fligstein, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Redding, 2005).”
- Collaborative Market Driving: How Peer Firms Can Develop Markets Through Collective Action (2020, background): “When firms drive markets, political action often is focal because existing legislation tends to protect the status quo (Fligstein 2001; Kjellberg and Olson 2016).”
- The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested Terrain: The (Non)adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation among German Firms (2004, background): “As a result, existing mental models should affect the willingness of managers to adopt a different conception of what a firm is and how it should be governed (cf. Hirsch, 1986; Espeland and Hirsch, 1990; Fligstein, 1990, 2001).”
- Markets as configurations (2011, background): “The strength of the scripting actor to influence the configuration relates to the idea of “habitus” in social fields (Bourdieu, 1977; Fligstein, 2001).”
- Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “…emphasis here is on the institutionalization of different cognitive and normative ideas of corporate governance, such as “shareholder value,” which arise within organizational fields as they are defined by the state, but also other actors such as investors and managers themselves (Fligstein, 2001).”
- Vive La Resistance: Competing Logics and the Consolidation of U.S. Community Banking (2007, background): “…of industries and fields, including the demographic mix of kinds of organizations, is fundamentally shaped by such jurisdictional struggles (e.g., Fligstein, 1996, 2001; Haveman & Rao, 1997; Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Scott, Reuf, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).”
- The political economy of comparative corporate governance (2003, result): “These types of economic arguments for continued divergence are closely related to recent research by political scientists and sociologists on the comparative politics of corporate governance (see, in particular, Cioffi and Cohen, 2000; Rhodes and van Appeldoorn, 1997; Fligstein, 2001).”
- Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories can Become Self-Fulfilling (2003, neutral): “The ideology of shareholder value brought the financial community, first, and the managerial community, later, to consider stockholders to be the most important constituency and to reject the claims of other stakeholders (Fligstein, 2001).”
- Structural Incoherence and Stock Market Activity (2004, background): “…since participation in multiple industries should make a firm harder to evaluate.10 Yet at the same time, diversified firms are often thought to be less volatile since they should be less sensitive to events associated with any single industry (e.g., Fligstein 1990; cf. Espeland and Hirsch 1990).”
- Do libertarians dream of electric coins? The material embeddedness of Bitcoin (2014, background): “It also poses a plethora of questions to tackle for sociologists, as indeed they have: What institutions created and sustain markets (Fligstein 2001), what networks are the actors involved in (Dimaggio and Louch 1998), what are the rules of engagement (Edelman and Stryker 2005), and where do…”
- In the Shadow. Illegal Markets and Economic Sociology (2013, positive): “Market actors need “stable worlds” (Fligstein 2001) or “calculability” (Weber 1978: 351) in order for role sets to be reproduced.”
- Institutional Entrepreneurship (2006, background): “…with the literature on sociology and management, in which there is an abundance of material on institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988, 1992; Fligstein, 1997, 2002; Garud et al, 2002; Greenwood et al, 2002; Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence et al, 2002; Lounsbury, 2002; Maguire et al, 2004).”